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La literatura reciente sobre las interrupciones súbitas de los flujos de capital está basada en el hecho 
de que muchas economías emergentes han experimentado bruscas y variadas reversiones en su cuenta 
financiera. El presente artículo argumenta que es más informativo estudiar el comportamiento de los 
flujos brutos del capital, que solo mirar el resultado neto de éstos. Se enfatiza el hecho de que 
mientras una economía puede sufrir una interrupción súbita de influjos de capital producto de ser 
excluida de los mercados financieros internacionales, otra economía puede estar llevando a cabo un 
ajuste de portafolio, que genera una salida súbita de capital y conduce al mismo efecto neto en la 
cuenta financiera. Al analizar los flujos brutos,  mostramos que entre países industriales y emergentes 
existe una variedad de experiencias que son heterogéneas entre sí. En particular, vemos que los 
frenazos de la entrada de capital son igual de comunes tanto en países industriales como en los países 
emergentes. La diferencia clave es que en el primer caso éstos están negativamente correlacionados 
con salidas de capital, lo que aminora el efecto neto final. Finalmente se presenta un modelo de 




The recent literature on sudden stops is based on the fact that many emerging market economies 
experience recurrent and sharp capital account reversals. In this paper we argue, as some recent 
research has started to emphasize, that more information can be obtained by looking at gross rather 
than net flows. Economies may be curtailed from international financial markets, resulting in a sudden 
stop of inflows, but others may be experiencing portfolio shifts that cause sudden start of capital 
outflows. By looking at gross flows, and comparing emerging markets (EMEs) with developed 
economies (DEs) we indeed show that there is a variety of experiences that cannot be lumped together. 
In particular, sudden stop of inflows are as common in DEs as in EMEs, but a key difference is that in 
the former outflows and inflows are negatively correlated, which dampen the reversal of net flows. We 
present a model of financial diversification to interpret these results which is consistent with most 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The financial crises of the second half of the 1990s have led to renewed interest in the causes and 
consequences of international capital flows. Sudden stops, defined as large drops in net capital 
inflows, have received particular attention, given the collapses in output and investment commonly 
associated with these events.1  
The premise in most of the recent literature on sudden stops is that emerging market economies 
are exposed to large fluctuations in the supply of international capital, as a result of imperfections in 
international financial markets (see Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía, 2004; Guidotti, Sturzenegger, and 
Villar, 2004; Frankel and Cavallo, 2004). In this literature, Wall Street is either the carrier of 
financial contagion or the originator of the shock itself. The origin of the stop in capital inflows is not 
a shift in either the mean or variance of the marginal productivity in the domestic economy, but 
rather a change in the willingness of foreign savers to invest in the domestic economy. In sudden 
stop episodes, net capital inflows are drastically curtailed, forcing the domestic economy to adjust via 
some combination of expenditure reduction and expenditure switching, a real exchange rate 
depreciation, and falling output.  
The existence of these imperfections—usually stemming from informational asymmetries—is 
certainly plausible, and it has recently received considerable empirical support.2 However, an 
identification problem makes it difficult to gauge just how important these factors are in explaining 
the sudden stops to net capital flows that have been observed in recent years. For a start, in the 
absence of a massive reserve accumulation and drawdown, the balance in the current account will 
move almost one to one with the balance in the capital account, making it impossible to determine 
whether the sudden stops are capital account developments or domestic savings-investment 
movements. Moreover, even when the sudden stop originates in the capital account, it could be 
driven by a sudden stop of gross capital inflows by foreigners (capital inflows) or by the decision of 
domestic agents to invest abroad (capital outflows). 
Identifying the relative importance of the different underlying shocks causing sudden stops has 
key policy implications. If the main source of capital account volatility is shocks to capital inflows, 
then vulnerability to external financial shocks becomes a central policy issue.3 On the other hand, a 
sudden stop in the capital account could simply reflect changes in savings and investment, which 
lead to balancing the current account after a period of persistent deficits as emphasized in the 
literature on current account reversals (Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1998). This could be expected 
from an economy after years of rapid expansion, where the current account deficit contributes to the 
financing of high investment rates, or the result of an improvement in the terms of trade. 
Alternatively, the current account reversal could be the result of policy mismanagements. For 
example, it might be triggered by an exchange rate misalignment, which could result in an 
unsustainable expansion of expenditure followed by a currency crisis and a curtailment in foreign 
financing. In this latter case, rather than pursuing a strategy of insurance, authorities should 
concentrate mainly on avoiding policies that can become a source of shocks, as emphasized in much 
of the crisis literature prior to the Mexican and Asian crises. Finally, understanding the causes and 
optimal responses to portfolio shifts by domestic agents leads to a third (and less understood) set of 
policy issues. 
                                                       
1. Edwards (2004) finds that the current account reversals associated with sudden stops lead to a decline in GDP growth 
of approximately 4 percent. Other estimates of the cost of sudden stops are presented in Guidotti, Sturzenegger, and Villar 
(2004). 
2. The role of international financial markets in contagion is evident in the transmission of shocks from a crisis country to 
one belonging to the same asset class (Rigobon, 2001), borrowing from the same international banks (van Rijckeghem and 
Weder, 2000), or sharing a set of overexposed mutual funds (Broner and Gelos, 2003). Evidence of international financial 
markets as a source of instability can be found in the recent literature that explores the role of risk premiums on emerging 
market bonds spreads in developed capital markets (García-Herrero and Ortiz, 2006; Daude and Ramos-Ballester, 2006). 
3. Holding international reserves as a means of self-insuring against sudden stops is one example of the type of policy 
being adopted by emerging market economies; see Calvo (2005); García and Soto (2006); Jeanne and Rancière (2006); 
Caballero and Cowan (2006). The use of contingent instruments that provide flows offsetting these sudden stops is a second 
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Unfortunately for the policymaker, the jury is still divided as to the relative role of fundamentals 
and external financial factors in explaining recent crises. The Asian financial crisis is a clear 
example, with two opposing sets of explanations. One view is that excessive reliance on short-term 
external debt left Asian emerging market economies vulnerable to shocks (and panics) from 
international financial markets.4 The alternative view is that the Asian financial crisis largely 
reflected policy distortions in the region, in particular distortions that led to excessive (mainly short-
term), borrowing by corporations and excessive lending by domestic banks (Corsetti, Pesenti, and 
Roubini, 1999). A second example is the range of explanations for current account fluctuations in 
emerging market economies. Aguiar and Gopinath (in this volume) emphasize the time series 
patterns of productivity in emerging market economies to explain the current account anomalies 
documented in these countries, whereas Guajardo (in this volume) focuses on the role of financial 
frictions.5  
The central theme of this paper is that additional information on the characteristics of 
international adjustments can be obtained by breaking net capital inflows into capital inflows (which 
correspond to the changes in the stocks of international liabilities of domestic residents) and outflows 
(which measure changes in the stocks of international assets of domestic residents).6 The key 
assumption is that the returns expected from international liabilities are driven by the shocks in 
international markets discussed above, whereas gross international assets are not directly affected 
by these variables. We can therefore use the relative variance and covariance of gross inflows and 
outflows to obtain information on the structure of shocks hitting both emerging and developed 
economies. 
We use gross flows to study two closely related issues: the role played by reversals of inflows in 
recent sudden stops and the overall pattern of gross inflows and outflows across emerging and 
developed economies.7 Specifically, the first section of the paper focuses on sudden stops, separating 
them according to the importance of gross inflows in the overall reversal of net capital flows.8 We 
find that one in five sudden stops corresponds to surges in capital outflows (sudden starts) rather 
than stops in inflows. This suggests that the importance of external financial shocks has been 
overestimated in the literature, with implications for optimal reserve management, the design of 
state contingent instruments, and so forth. We also find that the distinction between varieties of 
sudden stops matters: sudden starts are associated with smaller drops in output and investment 
than inflow-driven sudden stops. Finally, we show that the probability of experiencing a sudden start 
(conditional on a sudden stop) is higher in economies that have more developed domestic financial 
systems and are more open to trade. Although not conclusive, this last finding suggests an 
alternative explanation for the fact that the output cost of sudden stops (or current account 
reversals) is smaller for more open economies (see Edwards, 2004; Guidotti, Sturzenegger, and 
Villar, 2004). 
Next, the paper looks at inflow reversals and discusses the degree of coincidence between these 
and the sudden stop episodes identified in the literature. The main finding is that large inflow 
reversals are prevalent in both emerging and developed economies, but a much smaller share of 
them coincide with sudden stops in developed countries because of offsetting changes in outflows. 
Whereas the first part of the paper, section 2, concentrates on the lower tail of the distribution of 
changes in the net capital account (and gross inflows), the second part, section 3, characterizes 
capital flows in general. Not surprisingly, we find that emerging market economies have more 
                                                       
4. Furman and Stiglitz (1998); Radelet and Sachs (1998); Chang and Velasco (1998). 
5. See also Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005). 
6. A small but growing literature explores gross capital flows and capital account reversals. Faucette, Rothenberg, and 
Warnock (2005) separate capital account reversals into outflow- and inflow-induced shares, arguing that only the former 
correspond to sudden stops. Cowan and De Gregorio (2006) focus on the behavior of gross capital flows to Chile in the 1998 
capital account reversal. Finally, Rothenberg and Warnock (2007) follow a route similar to ours (see section 1, below) by 
looking at sudden stops caused by a large drop in inflows. 
7. The former objective is motivated by the finding, reported in Cowan and De Gregorio (2006), that the Chilean sudden 
stop of 1998 was atypical of sudden stops in Latin America in the 1990s, as it was almost completely driven by a surge in 
capital outflows instead of an abrupt reduction in inflows. 
8. Throughout the paper, we refer to large drops in net capital flows as sudden stops. In doing so, we follow the literature 
without judging the appropriateness of the expression, although it may be misleading, as should be clear from our discussion. Financial Diversification, Sudden Stops, and Sudden Starts  3 
 
volatile capital accounts than developed economies. This higher variance is not the result of more 
volatile capital inflows to emerging market economies, however, since the volatility of gross inflows 
is remarkably similar across country groups. Rather, it reflects a higher covariance between inflows 
and outflows in developed countries. This is the continuous counterpart to the finding that reversals 
of the capital account are highly correlated with stops to inflows in emerging market economies but 
not in developed countries. Indeed, we find that the correlation between gross inflows and outflows 
decreases with per capita income and financial integration. 
A simple conceptual framework provides a possible explanation for this empirical finding. We 
argue that sudden stops to inflows are prevalent in international financial markets, and that 
international assets holdings by residents provide the first line of defense against these non-
fundamental-driven shocks to capital flows. The key price variable is the expected return in the 
domestic economy. Drops in inflows must push up domestic returns if domestic assets invested 
abroad are to return to the domestic economy. An economy’s ability to absorb shocks to capital 
inflows will depend on its level of financial development (which will affect the interest rate response) 
and the stock of gross international assets (which places bounds on the size of the shock that can be 
absorbed). Arguably, developed economies are better prepared to face financial shocks along both 
dimensions. The second line of defense is provided by productive assets, capable of generating export 
revenues that offset the inflows. This is the role of the tradables sector in the Calvo, Izquierdo, and 
Mejía (2004) model. The key price variable for this second line of defense is the real exchange rate. 
This interpretation of the stylized facts on gross capital flows has several policy implications. The 
first relates directly to the current debate on global imbalances. Our results suggest that when 
shocks to the demand for U.S. assets arising from the portfolio decisions of foreign investors are not 
accompanied by changes in U.S. returns, they will be offset by shifts in U.S. foreign asset positions. 
The United States will not have to adjust its current account, and the impact on output will be small. 
The flip side is that countries outside the United States will experience a sudden stop to inflows from 
U.S. investors, leading to an unwinding of gross international asset positions in economies with 
gross asset positions and a capital account reversal in poorer economies. The second policy 
implication is that in setting optimal reserve and contingent asset policies, governments need to take 
into consideration both the total foreign asset positions of the private sector and the level of 
development of the domestic financial system before deciding the optimal level of coverage against 
external financing shocks. The importance of the financial system stems from the fact that foreign 
assets and liabilities are not likely to be held by the same agents in the economy, so they will need to 
be redistributed in times of distress. Financial underdevelopment will therefore distort the decision 
to save abroad in the first place, and it will then distort the decision to repatriate assets in case of a 
sudden stop. 
A second key issue is to correctly separate external financing shocks from shocks to the domestic 
marginal product of capital when determining the optimal reserve strategy. When faced by a 
productivity shock, pumping reserves into the domestic economy will simply lead to larger outflows 
(and rich speculators). 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses sudden stops and the role played by 
inflows and outflows. Section 3 describes the main stylized facts characterizing gross and net capital 
flows to developed and emerging market economies. It also presents a simple model to interpret the 
facts. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. SUDDEN STOPS AND SUDDEN STARTS 
 
This section classifies sudden stop episodes according to the relative importance of rising gross 
capital outflows and falling gross inflows. It also looks at large reversals in gross capital inflows and 
categorizes them according to their coincidence with sudden stops. The section starts with a brief 
description of the data and definitions used, before presenting and discussing the main results. 
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2.1 Data and Definitions 
 
Following balance-of-payment conventions, we define capital inflows as changes in the stock of 
international liabilities owed by domestic residents. These liabilities include equity (foreign direct 
investment and portfolio), bonded debt held by nonresidents, and loans from nonresident banks. 
Since they are changes in stocks, inflows can either be positive (a capital inflow) or negative (a 
reversal). Capital outflows, in turn, are changes in the foreign assets of domestic residents. 
International assets include offshore foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign equity and bonds held 
by resident, and loans to nonresidents (or offshore deposits). The capital account is simply the sum of 
net inflows (negative) and net outflows (positive). We use annual data on inflows and outflows from 
the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) for the period 1975 to 
2004. 
As we are primarily concerned with changes in private capital flows, we follow the literature on 
sudden stops in limiting our sample to emerging market economies (that is, those economies with 
access to voluntary private capital flows) and developed economies.9 For most of the exercises 
reported in this paper, we scale capital flows (inflows, outflows, and net capital flows) by a linear 
trend of dollar gross domestic product (GDP).10 T h i s  a l l o w s  u s  t o  d i sentangle capital account 
volatility from the volatility of real output and the real exchange rate. 
 
 
2.2 Identifying Different Types of Capital Account Reversal 
 
We follow Guidotti, Sturzenegger, and Villar (2004) in defining a sudden stop as a year in which 
the annual change in the capital account (scaled by GDP) is one standard deviation below the 
average and also below 5 percent of GDP. We take this definition because it is fairly representative 
of what the literature in this area has termed sudden stops. Both the standard deviation and the 
average are country specific. This leads us to identify a hundred sudden stop episodes in our sample 
of 1,580 observations (roughly 6 percent of the sample). We then build a measure of the contribution 
of the fall in inflows to each sudden stop episode:  
 









,  (1) 
 
where ΔIt and ΔOt are the changes in inflows and outflows, respectively, between t – 1 and the 
current (sudden stop) period, t. 
Figure 1 plots the histogram of for all hundred episodes. Most observations (56 percent) are 
between 0 and 1, indicating that inflows and outflows moved in the same direction: foreign liabilities 
fell, and foreign assets rose. Values above 1 (31 percent) mean that outflows undid the reversal of 
inflows, offsetting their impact on the financial account. Values below 0 (13 percent) imply that 
inflows actually rose during the sudden stop episode. 
We split the sudden stop episodes into three categories: outflow-driven sudden stops, which we 
define as StI < 0.25, inflow-driven sudden stops (StI > 0.75), and mixed cases. Figure 1 illustrates the 
split with dashed vertical lines. Our premise is that reversals driven by outflows do not correspond to 
external financing shocks, since changes in domestic residents’ portfolios are driving the net flow. 
Of the hundred sudden stops in the sample, just over half (fifty-seven) correspond to inflow-
driven sudden stops, whereas slightly below a fifth (eighteen) are outflow driven. These ratios 
change considerably when we split the sample into emerging and developed economies. Of the thirty-
six sudden stops in developed economies, only 40 percent are inflow driven. This ratio rises to 65 
                                                       
9. Appendix A lists the countries in our sample, which is based on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the countries listed in the EMBI+ index. 
10. Alternative measures that scale gross and net inflows by lagged GDP or a lagged moving average generate very 
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percent for emerging market economies. Sudden stops (as defined in the literature) are a better 
proxy for external financing shocks in emerging market economies than in developed countries. On 
the flip side, even in emerging market economies inflow-driven sudden stops are considerably less 
frequent than the net sudden stop measure suggests. In other words, many experiences that are 
called sudden stops are better described as a domestic shock that leads to a joint reaction of domestic 
and foreign agents. From the policy perspective, if external insurance decisions are based on sudden 
stop probabilities, then countries are overinsuring. 
Figure 2 plots the different types of reversal by year. As the figure shows, inflow-driven sudden 
stops are clustered around 1982–83 and 1997–98, as one would expect if indeed these events are 
driven by events in international financial markets. The figure also shows that outflow starts are a 
fairly recent phenomenon and are spread out evenly from the early 1990s onward. This may be 




2.3 Does the Distinction Matter? 
 
The next step is to investigate whether this distinction between types of sudden stop matters for 
macroeconomic outcomes. We explore this issue by looking at the behavior of key macroeconomic 
variables in a six-year window around the date of the net capital account reversal. Figure 3 shows 
the average path of output growth and investment before and after the sudden stop. Panel A 
indicates that per capita GDP growth diminishes in both cases. However, in the case of an inflow-
driven sudden stop, growth plummets from an average of 2.1 percent in the preceding three years to 
–1.1 percent and –1.2 percent in the year of the reversal and the following one, respectively. The 
decline in growth is smaller for outflow-driven sudden stops, from 2.3 percent before to 1.9 percent 
afterward. This is four times less than in inflow-driven sudden stops, where the drop was from 2.1 
percent to 0.6 percent average growth in the following years. Furthermore, table A2 shows that the 
average cumulative growth loss is 5.9 percent for inflow-driven sudden stops, while outflow reversals 
led to a reduction in growth of only –1.4 percent after three years. 
[Figure 3 here] 
Panel B reveals that investment falls by less in outflow-led reversals than in inflow-led sudden 
stops. In fact, the average cumulative loss in investment in the period following the sudden stop is 
almost twice as large in inflow stops (–15 percent) than in outflow starts (8 percent). 
The larger impact of inflow reversals in figure 3 is corroborated by the results presented in the 
growth regression in equation (2), where growth (g) is regressed on its own lag and dummies for 
sudden stops (ss) and inflow reversals (ins). Inflow reversals are significantly associated with longer 
crises in which output growth recovers slowly.11 
 
   
g





t−1 +ε.   (2) 
 
Table A2 in the appendix reports the following additional descriptive statistics for both varieties 
of sudden stop: GDP growth, investment, domestic credit over GDP, exports over GDP, and the 
exchange rate. When comparing inflow- and outflow-driven episodes, we find that exports and 
domestic credit to the private sector are larger in countries that experience outflow reversals. The 
results reported in figure 3 suggest an alternative explanation for the fact that more open countries 
experience lower output drops following sudden stops (Guidotti, Sturzenegger, and Villar, 2004): 
more open countries are more likely to experience an outflow-induced sudden stop. More research is 
needed, however, to fully address this issue. An interesting additional extension to this work would 
be to analyze the extent to which the determinants of net sudden stops differ from the determinants 
of inflow stops. Our previous results suggest they are different. In particular, the bunching of sudden 
                                                       
11. All coefficients are significant at 5 percent confidence. The results were robust for several specifications in which 
inflow-led sudden stops caused greater damage than mixed stops and outflow reversals. 6  Kevin Cowan, José de Gregorio, Alejandro Micco, and Christopher Neilson 
stops in figure 2 suggests that inflow stops are driven more by events in global financial markets 
than are outflow starts, but a definite conclusion can not yet be reached. 
 
 
2.4 Gross versus Net Inflow Reversals 
 
The previous subsection split sudden stops according to the importance of the inflow drop in the 
change in the net capital account. This procedure, however, excludes episodes in which inflows to a 
country are curtailed, but outflows adjust to offset the stop. To explore this possibility, we build a 
direct measure of gross inflow reversal and compare the incidence of these events with the net 
reversal (SS) discussed above. 
We define an inflow reversal as a period in which the change in non-FDI inflows, net of the 
average country change (scaled by trend GDP), is below –5 percent, which parallels our definition of 
sudden stops. We exclude FDI because we are interested in shocks originating in financial markets 
and because, as documented by Levchenko and Mauro (2006), FDI is remarkably stable even during 
sudden stops. 
Based on this definition, we identify 147 gross inflow reversals.12 Only sixty-two of these (42 
percent) coincide with the sudden stops defined as net reversals in the previous section. This 
suggests that outflows mitigate the effects of a sudden stop of inflows in most of the cases (eighty-
five inflow reversals). The most interesting fact is that a much higher share of gross inflow reversals 
coincide with net reversals in emerging market economies (forty-four out of sixty-six) than in 
developed countries (eighteen out of eighty-one). 
This simple analysis suggests that the key distinction between developed and emerging market 
economies is not in the volatility of non-FDI inflows, but in the covariance between inflows and 
outflows. Both groups have considerable amounts of gross inflow reversals (eighty-one in developed 
economies and sixty-six in emerging markets), but in emerging market economies, outflows do not 
offset the reversal of inflows. Of course, causality could be running in the opposite direction, with 
changes in outflows in developed economies leading to offsetting changes in inflows. We investigate 
this aspect of gross capital flows further in the following section. 
 
 
3. GROSS VERSUS NET CAPITAL FLOWS: STYLIZED FACTS 
 
The previous section focused on the lower tails of the distributions of net and gross capital 
inflows, and it further reduced the analysis of the tails to a set of arbitrary binary variables. Using 
these dummy variables is a reasonable approach if one thinks that the world behaves in a nonlinear 
way, with economies running into vertical supply constraints, as in the work of Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2001) and others. By focusing on these episodes, however, we are disregarding a lot 
of information on gross and net capital flows from our sample. Moreover, defining episodes 
necessarily involves discretionary choices in the establishment of thresholds, which may not coincide 
with the vertical episodes of theoretical models. With these concerns in mind, in this section we 
characterize gross and net capital flows for our sample of developed and emerging market economies. 
We begin by identifying the differences and similarities between these two (also arbitrary) groups of 
countries. We then move to a more general (and robust) approach that differentiates the behavior of 
capital flows across income levels and degrees of financial integration. 
 
 
                                                       
12. The 147 gross inflow reversals consist of eighty-five that are gross reversals only and sixty-two in which the inflow 
reversal coincides with a net reversal. According to the standard definition of sudden stops, however, there are only a hundred 
episodes, of which thirty-eight are net reversals only (that is, without an inflow reversal) and thus are sudden starts rather 
than sudden stops. The remaining sixty-two are net reversals and gross inflow reversals. The same computations can be made 
across rows for developed and emerging market economies. Financial Diversification, Sudden Stops, and Sudden Starts  7 
 
3.1 Capital Flows in Emerging and Developed Economies 
 
Figure 4 plots the average gross capital flows in emerging and developed economies.13 The figure 
reveals at least three notable trends. First, gross flows swamp net flows in developed economies. 
This is the flow counterpart of the increasing level of financial integration documented by Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2003). Second, gross inflows and outflows in developed economies took off in earnest 
in the second half of the 1990s and leveled off in the current decade, while outflows are a very recent 
feature in emerging markets. Finally, gross flows in emerging market economies lag considerably 
behind those of developed economies, so that the average gross flows of emerging market economies 
in 2004 were similar to the average gross flows of the developed economies in the mid-1970s. Until 
the second half of the 1990s, emerging market economies mostly had net capital inflows. This 
changed in the current decade, as many emerging market economies countries have been 
accumulating reserves and posting current account surpluses. 
We turn now to the variance of the changes in gross inflows and outflows and net flows. Our 
working with changes instead of levels is motivated by the literature on sudden stops and reversals 
that emphasizes the macroeconomic consequences of these reversals. Gross and net flows are 
normalized by trend GDP. We also remove the (usually insignificant) country mean of the changes to 
separate country trends from volatility. We denote the change in the net capital account ΔF, changes 
in inflows ΔI, and changes in outflows ΔO. 
Our first result is that emerging market economies have more volatile net capital flows than 
developed economies, as expected. Table 2 shows that the standard deviation of ΔF in the average 
(median) emerging market economy is 80 percent (110 percent), higher than in the average (median) 
developed economy. This is in line with the results from the previous section, which found that large 
negative values of ΔF (sudden stops) are more common in emerging market economies than in 
developed countries. This result is confirmed in figure 5, which plots the negative segment of the 
cumulative distribution functions for ΔF.  
Our second finding is that the volatility of inflows is remarkably similar across emerging market 
and developed economies. Large reversals in inflows are equally as likely in the two groups. We find 
this to be true for both FDI and non-FDI inflows. To corroborate this point, figure 6 plots the 
cumulative distribution functions of ΔI in both developed and emerging market economies. 
This result is at odds with the presumption that volatile inflows cause emerging market 
economies to face a larger flux of net capital flows, which then leads recurrently to sudden stop 
episodes. To investigate this issue further, we separate the determinants of the volatility of ΔF using 
a simple variance-decomposition exercise. We split the variance in both groups of countries into the 
variance of non-FDI inflows (σ2nfdiI), FDI inflows (σ2fdiI), outflows (σ2O), and their respective 
covariances. Table 2 confirms that the volatility of inflows is of similar magnitudes in emerging 
market and developed economies, although the volatility of net capital flows is much higher in 
emerging market economies than developed countries. Moreover, table 3 shows that outflows are 
more volatile in developed than in emerging market economies. Most of the volatility of ΔF, however, 
is explained by the much larger negative covariance between non-FDI inflows and outflows in 
developed than in emerging market economies (row 5).  
We can thus conclude that what makes reversals much less common in developed countries 
relative to emerging market economies is the strongly negative correlation between inflows and 
outflows in the first group of countries. In developed economies, capital outflows mitigate the effect 
of a sudden reversal of inflows (or vice versa). 
 
 
                                                       
13. The group averages presented in figure 4 hide considerable cross-country variation, as is evident in figure A1. We 
exclude offshore financial centers, in which inflows and outflows are automatically matched, since capital is raised and 
funneled offshore once again. We therefore decided to exclude Ireland, Belgium, Great Britain, and Switzerland from our 
sample at this point, because they are outliers in terms of the size of average inflows and outflows. 8  Kevin Cowan, José de Gregorio, Alejandro Micco, and Christopher Neilson 
 
3.2 Discussion of Results: A Simple Framework of Gross Flows 
 
In this section, we present a simple mean-variance portfolio framework to help explain the 
stylized facts documented in the previous subsection.14 Consider a small open economy in which 
there is a premium between domestic returns and international returns. We assume that this 
premium (ρ + ξ I) is the loss to foreign investors from selective defaults on debt contracts or 
expropriation risk. This premium is increasing in the level of foreign liabilities held by domestic 
agents (I). The higher the level of foreign debt, the larger the incentive to default. More generally, it 
is not important that only foreigners bear these costs; what is crucial in our framework is that the 
costs are perceived to be higher for foreigners. The risk premium, ρ, is stochastic with a mean equal 
to μρ and variance of σ2
ρ. 
Domestic residents have a stock of wealth (W ≥ 0) that they can invest in a risky technology at 
home (H ≥ 0) or abroad at a riskless rate R* (O ≥ 0). Returns to the domestic technology are a 
decreasing function of total capital, K, such that 
 
   R = A −α K , 
 
and  A is random productivity term, with a time-varying mean, μ, and constant variance, σ2. 
Productivity in this case is a broad expression for profitability, which should also include terms of 
trade shocks, macroeconomic policies, and so forth. In addition, ρ and μ are realized before domestic 
and foreign investors make their portfolio decisions. The only remaining source of uncertainty is the 
realized return on domestic output, A. 
International investors are risk neutral, so the following international arbitrage condition holds 
for capital inflows, I: 
 
 
   
μ−α K = R
∗ +ρ + ξ I ( ).   (3) 
 
We assume that domestic productivity is such that μ  −  αW >  ρ  +   R
∗, over the whole support of ρ, so 
that there are nonzero capital inflows even when all domestic wealth is invested domestically. 
Equation (3), pins down total capital in the domestic economy: 
 
   
K =





Domestic agents maximize a mean variance utility function, which after substituting for returns is:  
 
   








where γ represents risk aversion and (Hσ)2 is the variance of the portfolio of domestic agents. From 
the first order condition for H, we obtain the following optimal portfolio allocation for local residents:  
 
   










 , and  (4) 
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(DSGE) macroeconomic framework that generates a general equilibrium with meaningful capital flows. Financial Diversification, Sudden Stops, and Sudden Starts  9 
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where φ = [(1/α) + (1/γσ2)]. 
Next we analyze two possible outcomes for this model, depending on total domestic wealth being 
above or below 
 
  ( )
∗ ⎧⎫ ⎡⎤ ρ+ξ μ− α ⎪⎪ ⎣⎦
⎨⎬






W ,  
 
which is obtained by using I from equation (5) in H from equation (4). 
 
3.2.1 Case 1:  W <W 
 
This is the case of financial diversification, in which a nonzero share of domestic wealth is 
invested offshore. Using the previous results we can find expressions for the stock of international 
assets (O)—which, following the balance-of-payment conventions, is negative—and the net capital 
account (F): 
 
  ( )
∗ ⎧⎫ ⎡⎤ ρ+ξ μ− α ⎪⎪ ⎣⎦ −+ ⎨⎬






OW ;   (6) 
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FR W . (7) 
 
Here, O is the difference between demand for capital and domestic wealth, the remainder being 
owned by foreigners. In this case, I > 0 because of the assumption made above on the parameters. 
Foreign assets are decreasing (in absolute terms) in the country risk premium and in the sensitivity 
of foreign investment to the level foreign liabilities (ξ), and they are increasing in wealth.
15 
Using the above expressions, we can check that the following equations hold for the variance and 
covariance of inflows and outflows in the face of shocks to expected domestic productivity, μ, and the 
risk premium, ρ: 
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2 is the variance of μ. The covariance between inflows and outflows is more negative the 
larger are the shocks to the risk premiums, σρ
2, but it is closer to zero the larger the shocks to 
productivity, σμ
2. This is intuitive: when facing a rise in ρ, domestic agents will repatriate part of 
their savings to take advantage of higher domestic returns. If the shock is to productivity, however, 
then domestic agents and foreigners will move their funds in the same direction. 
 
3.2.2 Case 2:  W ≥ W  
 
In this case, all of domestic wealth is invested at home. Returns are high enough to compensate 
for the increased risk domestic investors face. Here, O = 0, and F = I = K – W. 
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The structure of variances and covariance is given by  
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This simple framework illustrates several plausible differences between emerging and developed 
economies that may explain the stylized facts reported in the previous section. First, emerging 
market economies are more likely than developed economies to have low wealth, high ρ, high ξ, or 
large foreign liabilities that push up the total risk premium, and they are also more likely to hold no 
or few international assets. This being the case, emerging market economies will have a lower 
covariance (in absolute terms) between inflows and outflows. Matching the similar σI2 across 
emerging and developed economies is not so simple in this setting, however. Indeed, which σI2 is 
higher is ambiguous. 
A second possibility that is often discussed in the literature puts emerging market economies in 
the  < WW  region, but with a more volatile production technology (that is, a higher σμ
2). In this 
model the higher σμ
2 leads to a covariance of inflows and outflows that is closer to zero (or even 
positive), which matches the stylized facts. A higher σμ
2, however, also translates into a higher σI2 for 
emerging market economies, a fact that is not supported by the data. 
The final possibility is closest to the sudden stop literature. Consider the case in which emerging 
market economies face more volatile financing (that is, a higher σρ
2) or a steeper supply curve for 
international capital. Both correspond to imperfections in international capital markets. Note, 
however, that higher σρ
2 in emerging market economies would actually lead to a larger (absolute) 
covariance between inflows and outflows. A higher ξ, in turn, has an ambiguous effect on σIO and 
dampens σI2.  
This simple model illustrates how several differences (financial or productive) between emerging 
and developed economies are consistent with the differences in moments reported above. Moreover, Financial Diversification, Sudden Stops, and Sudden Starts  11 
 
simply splitting countries into emerging and developed economies, does not clarify which specific 
variable is driving the differences. With this in mind, we use the following section to characterize 
differences in σIO, the key component in the variance decomposition. Our main objective is to 
disentangle the productive and financial differences. 
 
3.3 Income Levels, Risk Premiums, and Assets Abroad 
 
A first implication of the model presented above is that the stock of foreign assets held by 
domestic residents (equation 6) is increasing in wealth and decreasing in the spread charged by 
foreign investors on domestic assets. To evaluate this implication, table 4 estimates the correlation 
between gross international assets over GDP, per capita income (a proxy of financial wealth), and 
the Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) spread or Moody’s country debt rating (a proxy for risk 
premium). The sample is limited to countries for which data on the EMBI or debt rating is available. 
The first column reports the simple cross-section correlation for 2001 between external assets over 
GDP and the log of the EMBI spread. As expected, the correlation is negative and significant: 
countries with a low risk premium have more assets abroad. To control for wealth, we include the log 
of per capita GDP in the second column. The estimated signs are as expected, although significance 
is lost. The results are similar when we use country debt ratings instead of the EMBI spread (column 
3).16 The next two columns pool all available years and run country fixed-effects regressions using 
the EMBI spread and country debt ratings, respectively. In both regressions, as the model predicts, 
the correlation between the proxy for country premium and gross international assets is negative, 
even after controlling for a country fixed effect. As a country’s investment premium falls, the gap 
between domestic and foreign returns falls, and thus investment abroad increases. 
 
3.4 Capital Flows, Income Levels, and Financial Integration 
 
A second implication of the model is that countries that are more likely to be in the 
internationally diversified region will have a more negative covariance of inflows and outflows, so 
that international diversification reduces the volatility of the net capital account. We start by 
analyzing the covariance of ΔIi,t and ΔOi,t across levels of international financial assets and overall 
levels of economic development (as measured by per capita income). We include per capita income as 
a catch-all term, which is likely to be correlated with the structure of shocks hitting the economy, 
σμ
2, or with access to international capital markets (higher σρ
2 or higher ξ). 
Specifically, we estimate  
 
 








it .   (8) 
 
The first two columns of table 5 report the results for the full sample, while the next two columns 
provide the results for the subsamples of emerging and developed economies, respectively. We find 
that σIO is decreasing in the level of assets abroad in all specifications (with significant coefficients). 
This suggests that part of the difference between emerging and developed economies stems from 
their level of financial integration. Moreover, we also obtain a negative coefficient for per capita 
income (significant in the median regression in the second column), which is consistent with either 
larger productivity shocks or potentially less financial integration (in the form of higher  ξ). 
Next, to use time variation in the main independent variables, we study the yearly comovement 
of changes in outflows (ΔOi,t) and inflows (ΔIi,t), allowing the comovement to vary across levels of 
gross foreign assets and per capita income. Specifically, we estimate  
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where yi.t–1 is the lagged log of per capita GDP. We are interested in γ2, which measures the impact of 
per capita income on the correlation between ΔΟi,t and ΔΙi,t and γ3, where the latter captures the 
effects of foreign assets on this correlation. The results of this estimation are presented in table 6. 
Our results are qualitatively identical to those reported in the previous table. The first column 
present the result for the full sample, while the next two columns report the results for the 
subsamples of emerging and developed economies, respectively. In all cases we obtain a negative 
coefficient for γ2, which is significant for the full sample and for developed economies. The correlation 
between inflows and outflows falls with the income level, even within emerging and developed 
economies and after controlling for foreign assets. More importantly, we obtain negative and 
significant coefficients for γ3 in all samples. Countries holding more gross foreign assets (that is, that 
are more financially integrated) show lower correlations between gross inflows and gross outflows. 
In the simple model presented above, after we control for the level of financial integration, the 
remaining differences across countries were captured by productivity shocks, σμ
2, and financial 
variables, ξ. The difference in the volatility of productivity certainly is one plausible explanation, as 
suggested by Aguiar and Gopinath (in this volume). It also seems reasonable that the risk premiums 
grow faster with debt in emerging market economies. However, this is not an exhaustive list of 
explanations for the results reported in the previous three tables. For a start, in the model, σμ
2 can 
also be thought to capture shifts in the perceptions of productivity common to domestic and foreign 
savers. If these are more likely to change in lower-income countries, as has been emphasized by the 
“wake-up call” literature, then information asymmetries and updating of priors explain the stylized 
facts, not true productivity patterns. Per capita income may also be capturing variations in financial 
development that condition how inflows and outflows covary. As emphasized by Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2001), agents holding foreign assets are not usually the agents borrowing from 
international markets. The extent to which O will respond to a shock to I that drives up the marginal 
product of domestic borrowers will depend on the ability of the domestic financial system to 
intermediate resources from one agent to another. It remains to be seen, for example, whether the 
Chilean institutional investors that currently hold large stocks of foreign assets will repatriate their 
foreign assets in the event of a shock to the cost of Chilean external financing. Finally, the model 
presented above assumes that domestic productivity rises when foreign investors withdraw, as a 
result of a decreasing marginal product of capital. This is probably true in economies that are 
financially robust—which is not always the case in lower-income economies. Indeed, an extensive 
literature emphasizes the financial vulnerabilities that arrive from currency and maturity 
mismatches. This being the case, the fact that outflows in low-income economies accompany inflows 




This paper provides a broad empirical characterization of gross and net capital flows to emerging 
and developed economies. The first part of the paper centers on reversals—either large changes in 
net capital flows or large changes in gross inflows. The second part of the paper looks at gross 
inflows and outflows and analyzes the variance and covariance of gross inflows and outflows more 
generally. Accordingly, the conclusions of the paper also fall into two groups. We discuss each in 
turn. 
A large (and growing) literature examines the causes and effects of large reversals in the capital 
account (sudden stops), as these events are usually associated with output loss or financial distress. 
This paper argues that by concentrating on the full set of reversals, we are bunching too many 
phenomena together. The reversal could be a current account reversal, driven by changes in the 
saving-investment decisions. Shocks to the terms of trade or productivity, or even policy shocks such 
as changes in public savings or exchange rate misalignments, all fall into this category. 
Alternatively, the reversal could be triggered on the financial side, driven by the capital account. It is 
therefore is necessary to distinguish two types of reversal. The event could be a true curtailment of 
capital inflows (the idea behind the sudden stop literature), or it could be driven by the decision of 
domestic residents to diversify their portfolios and invest abroad. Financial Diversification, Sudden Stops, and Sudden Starts  13 
 
With these distinctions in mind, we split sudden stops—that is, large reversals in the capital 
account—into inflow-driven and outflow-driven reversals. We then argue that it is the former that 
corresponds to shocks originating in international capital markets emphasized by much recent 
literature, and these inflow reversals are the true sudden stops. This distinction narrows the number 
of episodes substantially, suggesting that the incidence of sudden stops may have been overstated. 
Moreover, we show that the inflow-driven sudden stops have the largest output and investment 
costs, and we confirm that this form of shock is truly costly for merging market economies. 
In the second part of the paper, we show—contrary to what is often proposed—that international 
financial markets for developed economies are as turbulent as those for emerging markets, with 
large reversals in gross flows. The key distinction appears to be that for emerging market economies, 
shocks to inflows (or outflows) are not offset by an opposing movement from outflows (inflows). This 
may be due to differences in the nature of shocks (productivity shocks versus risk premium shocks) 
or simply to a lack of international assets with which to accommodate a reversal of inflows. 
Moreover, we find that the negative covariance between inflows and outflows is higher for countries 
with high initial stocks of international assets and higher per capita income. We take the first 
variable as a proxy for the capacity to smooth portfolio shocks, and the second as a broad proxy for 
the willingness to smooth shocks. Taken together, this implies that emerging market economies are 
less able to accommodate sudden stops in inflows because they hold much smaller stocks of foreign 
assets, on average, and they are often less willing to do so because the inflow is responding to lower 
realized or expected domestic productivity, because domestic financial markets are subject to 
failures, or because domestic and foreign agents anticipate the costs of a gross flow reversal if the 
economy is financially vulnerable. 
The results presented in this paper motivate a series of additional research questions that are 
relevant for emerging market economies. First, analysts need to develop models that link optimal 
reserve levels to total foreign assets and domestic financial development. Countries with large stocks 
of foreign assets would likely need fewer reserves, particularly if the financial system operates 
properly. Second, further research is needed to determine whether the determinants of sudden stops 
are the same as the determinants of inflow-driven sudden stops. If differences are found, the 
preventive policies will differ. Third, additional research is needed to understand gross outflow 
shocks in developed and emerging market economies that are not fully offset by capital inflows. A 
key issue in this regard is identifying the set of domestic or international conditions, such as 
regulatory changes or macroeconomic policies, that leads to sudden outflows of capitals.  
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APPENDIX 
Supplemental Data, Stylized Facts, and Regression Results  
 
Table A1. Sample of Countriesa 
Developed economies    Emerging market economies 
Country  IFS code  World Bank code   Country IFS  code World Bank code 
Australia 193  AUS   Algeria 612  DZA 
Austria 122  AUT   Argentina 213  ARG 
Belgium 124  BEL   Brazil 223  BRA 
Canada 156  CAN   Bulgaria 918  BGR 
Denmark 128  DNK   Chile 228  CHL 
Finland 172  FIN   Colombia 233  COL 
France 132  FRA   Costa Rica  238  CRI 
Germany 134  DEU   Côte d'Ivoire  662  CIV 
Iceland 176  ISL   Croatia 960  HRV 
Ireland 178  IRL   Dominican Republic  243 DOM 
Italy 136  ITA   Ecuador 248  ECU 
Japan 158  JPN   Egypt 469  EGY 
Netherlands 138  NLD   Hungary 944  HUN 
New Zealand  196  NZL   India 534  IND 
Norway 142  NOR   Indonesia 536  IDN 
Portugal 182  PRT   Jordan 439  JOR 
Spain 184  ESP   Korea 542  KOR 
Sweden 144  SWE   Malaysia 548  MYS 
Switzerland 146 CHE   Mexico 273  MEX 
United Kingdom  112  GBR   Morocco 686  MAR 
United States  111  USA   Nigeria 694  NGA 
        Pakistan 564  PAK 
        Peru 293  PER 
        Philippines 566  PHL 
        Poland 964  POL 
        Russia 922  RUS 
        South Africa  199  ZAF 
        Thailand 578  THA 
        Tunisia 744  TUN 
        Turkey 186  TUR 
        Uruguay 298  URY 
        Venezuela, R.B.  299  VEN 
a. The sample was selected by starting with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and adding countries from the EMBI index of 
emerging economies. Countries that were present in both groups were considered emerging economies. Hungry, Korea, Mexico, Poland, and Turkey thus fell into the 
category of emerging economies, although they are members of the OECD. The Czech Republic, Greece, Luxembourg, Panama, and the Slovak Republic were dropped 





Figure A1. Heterogeneity in Average Gross Inflows and Outflows, 1999–2004a 
Authors’ calculations, based on IFS data.  
a. Gross inflows and outflows are shown as a percent of trend GDP. Ireland, Belgium, Great Britain, and Switzerland have been excluded as outliers. All have 























































































0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2Table A2. Impact of Outflow and Inflow Sudden Stopsa 
   GDP  growth    Investment    Domestic Credit    Exports    Exchange Rate 
  Measure of Impact  Inflows  Outflows    Inflows  Outflows   Inflows Outflows  Inflows Outflows   Inflows Outflows 
(1)  Maximum before    2.6    2.6      25.7  25.0      0.52    0.75    28.9  41.8      100.0  100.0 
(2)  Minimum after  –1.2    0.5      20.7  22.2      0.51    0.73    31.8  41.5        53.1    81.4 
(3)  (1) – (2)    3.8    2.1        5.0    2.8      0.02    0.02    –2.9    0.2        46.9    18.6 
(4)  Mean before    2.1    2.3      25.3  24.7      0.50    0.73    28.8  41.4        91.7    97.5 
(5)  Mean after    0.6    1.9      21.7  22.8      0.53    0.77    32.9  45.3        61.2    86.5 
(6)  (4) – (5)    1.5    0.4        3.6    2.0    –0.03  –0.04    –4.1  –3.8        30.5    11.0 
(7) Cumulative  loss  –5.9  –1.4    –14.5  –7.9      0.10    0.20    16.3  15.4    –122.0  –44.0 
a. Sudden stop episodes cover the three years before the reversal and the three years after, resulting in a total of seven years including the sudden stop year. All statistics denominated after include t = 0. Cumulative loss is 







Table A3. Volatility of Capital Flows and GDPa 
Dependant variable 










Cov FDI inflows  
versus outflows (σfdiI ,Δ￿) 
Cov non-FDI inflows 
versus outflows 
(σ￿fdiI ,Δ￿) 
ln (GDP)  –58.28**  10.127  9.82  50.87*** –0.653**  –4.001*** 
 –25.025  –26.195  –26.975  –19.352  –0.281  –1.443 
Constant  0.089 0.037 0.039  –0.013  0.000  0.003 
 –0.021  –0.022  –0.023  –0.016  0.000  –0.001 
R2  0.103 0.003 0.003 0.128  0.103  0.141 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
a. In the table, ln(GDP) is the log of the average purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita during the sample period divided by 10,000.  
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Table A4. Change in Outflows versus Change Inflow: Regression Resultsa 
 Regression  results    Sample 





errors  N R2    Emerging  Developed    1975–89 1990–2004   SS = 1  SS = 0 
A. Right-hand-side variable is Δ non-FDI inflows                
(1) –0.165  0.051***  781  0.09    x     x x    x x 
(2) –0.583  0.046***  506  0.47     x    x x    x x 
(3) –0.069  0.044  342  0.03    x     x     x x 
(4) –0.214  0.070***  439  0.12    x      x    x x 
(5) –0.234  0.063***  236  0.14     x    x     x x 
(6) –0.653  0.048***  270  0.54     x     x    x x 
(7) –0.326  0.128**  64  0.31    x     x x    x  
(8) –0.251  0.066***  717  0.14    x     x x     x 
(9) –0.765  0.079***  31  0.76     x    x x    x  
(10) –0.672  0.042***  475  0.55     x    x x     x 
                       
B. Right-hand-side variable is Δ inflows                
(1) –0.171  0.048***  781  0.1    x     x x    x x 
(2) –0.62  0.038***  506  0.58     x    x x    x x 
(3) –0.065  0.042  342  0.03    x     x     x x 
(4) –0.223  0.065***  439  0.14    x      x    x x 
(5) –0.243  0.063***  236  0.15     x    x     x x 
(6) –0.689  0.039***  270  0.67     x     x    x x 
(7) –0.346  0.129***  64  0.34    x     x x    x  
(8) –0.264  0.062***  717  0.17    x     x x     x 
(9) –0.803  0.070***  31  0.88     x    x x    x  
(10) –0.697  0.033***  475  0.67     x    x x     x 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
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Authors’ calculations, based on IFS data.  
a. The share of inflows in the capital account is defined by equation (1). The dashed vertical line identifies the categories of different types of 
reversals. A value between 0 and 1 means that both outflows and inflows contributed to the reversal. Values above 1 and below 3 imply that outflows and 
inflows, respectively, undid the reversal of the capital account. 
 
 
















Authors’ calculations, based on IFS data.  
a. Inflow-induced reversals (sudden stops) are those in which StI > 0.75; outflow-induced reversals (sudden starts) are those in which StI < 0.25. 




 Figure 3. Heterogeneity in Impact of Sudden Stops and Sudden Startsa 
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Authors’ calculations, based on IFS data.  
a. Growth and investment are averages over the sample of episodes identified in the previous section. Reversals in which both inflows and outflows 
are responsible (0.25 < StI < 0.75) are not shown and represent 25 percent of all reversals identified. Figure 4. Yearly Average Gross Inflows and Outflows through Timea 
 

































Authors’ calculations, based on IFS data.  




















Authors’ calculations, based on IFS data.  
a. The above figure ignores the positive section of the cumulative distribution of net capital flows. Net flows are lower in emerging market economies.  
 
 
















Authors’ calculations, based on IFS data.  
a. The above figure ignores the positive section of the cumulative distribution of non-FDI inflows. Gross non-FDI inflows have a similar distribution 






Table 1. Coincidence of Net and Gross Inflow Reversalsa 
Sample group   Both coincide  Only net reversal  Only gross reversal 
Developed  economies 18 18 63 
Emerging  market  economies  44 20 22 
Total  62 38 85 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IFS data. 
a. The first column indicates the number of episodes that were defined as a net reversal as defined in section 1.1 and a gross reversal defined using non-FDI 




Table 2. Volatility of Capital Flows 
  σΔF    σΔI 
Sample group  Mean country  Median country   Mean country  Median country 
(1) Developed economies  0.027  0.021    0.044 0.041 
(2) Emerging market economies  0.048  0.043    0.049 0.043 
(2)/(1) –1.8  2.1    1.1 1.0 




Table 3. Variance Decompositiona 









Share of  
total  
Var (Δ Non-FDI inflows)  26.3  20.9  5.3      0.30 
Var (Δ FDI inflows)    1.6    3.1         –1.5    –0.08 
Var (Δ Outflows)    7.9  16.1         –8.3    –0.45 
2Cov (Δ Non-FDI inflows, Δ FDI inflows)    0.4  –1.1           1.5      0.08 
2Cov (Δ Non-FDI inflows, Δ Outflows)          –8.5        –25.6         17.0      0.95 
2Cov (Δ FDI inflows, Δ Outflows)          –1.0          –4.4  3.4      0.19 
Var (Δ Financial account)          26.6            8.5         18.0     1.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IFS data.  




Table 4. Country Risk and Gross International Asset Positionsa 
Explanatory  variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log EMBI  –0.300  –0.219    –0.086   
  (0.158)*  (0.161)   (0.038)**  
Rating     0.293  0.018 
     (0.120)**  (0.008)** 
Log GDPt–1   0.131  0.029    
   (0.155)  (0.029)     
Summary statistic       
No. observations  22  22  29  156  313 
R2  0.16 0.19  0.2  0.91 0.91 
Period 2001  2001  2001  1992–2004  1986–2004 
Fixed effects        Country and year 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
a. The dependent variable is external assets over GDP. Rating ranges from 1 to 16. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
   
Table 5. Covariance Changes on Outflows and Inflows (over GDP)a 
Explanatory variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Assets abroad (avg ln)  –7.351  –4.234  –7.303  –8.602 
 (2.848)**  (1.516)***  (3.791)*  (4.824)* 
Per capita GDP (avg ln)  –0.219  –1.708  –0.886  –1.22 
 (1.532)  (0.841)**  (2.805)  (3.045) 
Summary statistic        
No. observations  48  49  31  17 
R2 0.22    0.17  0.2 
Method OLS  Median  OLS  OLS 
Sample  All countries  All countries  Emerging markets  Developed 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  




Table 6. Baseline Regression: Changes in Outflows and Changes in Gross Inflows 
Explanatory variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
A. Inflows are changes in non–FDI inflows over trend GDP      
Interactions     
Δ Inflows x ln (GDP) (–1)  –0.096 –0.09 –0.094 
  (0.048)** (0.091)  (0.055)* 
Δ Inflows x Gross assets to GDP (–1)  –0.185 –0.174 –0.214 
  (0.055)*** (0.073)** (0.063)*** 
Main effects      
Δ Inflows  –0.235 –0.231 –0.207 
  (0.024)*** (0.048)***  (0.100)** 
ln (GDP) (–1)  0 0  –0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Gross assets to GDP (–1)  0 0 0 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
B. Inflows are changes in all inflows over trend GDP      
Interactions     
Δ Inflows x ln (GDP) (–1)  –0.101 –0.074 –0.111 
  (0.042)** (0.085)  (0.041)*** 
Δ Inflows x Gross assets to GDP (–1)  –0.203 –0.183 –0.251 
  (0.048)*** (0.069)*** (0.052)*** 
Main effects      
Δ Inflows  –0.243 –0.224 –0.176 
  (0.022)*** (0.045)***  (0.092)* 
ln (GDP) (–1)  0 0  –0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Gross assets to GDP (–1)  0 0 0 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Summary statistic     
No. observations  1,271  770  501 
Sample All  countries  Emerging Developed 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
a. The dependent variable is the change in outflows. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
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